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Introduction
In the last ten years, a healthy debate about the moral nature and
limits of apology has emerged, focused particularly on the growing
practice of official apologies by states, governments, corporations
and churches. There now exists a substantial body of work dedicated
to distinguishing the conditions for a morally and politically adequate
public apology, and how these relate to broader issues of historical
and collective responsibility, as well as numerous articles theorizing
the language, pragmatics, politics, discourse, economics,
performance, cultural variation and emotions involved in publicly
apologizing.1

See, for example, Michael Cunningham, “Saying Sorry: The Politics of Apology,”
The Political Quarterly 70.3 (1999): 285–293, doi:10.1111/1467-923X.00231; John
Borneman, “Public Apologies as Performative Redress,” SAIS Review 25.2 (2005):
53–66, doi:10.1353/sais.2005.0028; Sandra Harris, Karen Grainger, and Louise
Mullany, “The Pragmatics of Public Apologies,” Discourse and Society 17.6 (2006):
715–737; Alison Dundes Renteln, “Apologies: A Cross-Cultural Analysis,” in The
Age of Apology: Facing up to the Past, ed. Mark Gibney et al. (Pennsylvania: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 61–76; Matt James, “Wrestling with the Past:
Apologies, Quasi-Apologies, and Non-Apologies in Canada,” in The Age of Apology:
Facing Up to the Past, ed. Mark Gibney et al. (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2008), 137–153; M. Augoustinos, B. Hastie, and M. Wright,
“Apologizing for Historical Injustice: Emotion, Truth and Identity in Political
Discourse,” Discourse and Society 22.5 (2011): 507–531.
1
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It is disappointing, therefore, that theoretical work on the
topic has largely failed to take seriously questions of gender.2 The
severity of this omission is especially striking once we acknowledge
the growing body of evidence concerning “the ways gender plays a
role in generating, or at least shaping, the forms and the effects of
political violence perpetrated under authoritarian regimes and during
armed conflict.”3 Gender is deeply implicated in some of the most
serious harms for which public apology is invoked as remedy.
Similarly, feminist work in philosophy, psychotherapy, and on
restorative justice has highlighted the significant role that gender
plays in practices of apologizing; indeed, this research suggests that
acts of apology (both private and public, political and apolitical) are
already gendered, often in problematic ways.4 It would seem that
gender rears its head when we consider the figure of the apologizer,
Aaron Lazare and Nick Smith both include short sections on gender and apology,
but in both cases their discussion is largely limited to the comparative apology
styles of men and women and, in particular, claims based on sociologist Deborah
Tannen’s work, that women apologize more than men. My intention in this paper is
to convince the reader that the relationship between gender and the practice of
apologizing goes far deeper than the quality and quantity of men’s and women’s
individual utterances. See Aaron Lazare, On Apology (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), 27-31; see also Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 108-113.
3 Ruth Rubio-Marin, “The Gender of Reparations in Transitional Societies,” in The
Gender of Reparations: Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies While Redressing Human Rights
Violations, ed. Ruth Rubio-Marin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009),
63.
4 See J. Haaken, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Psychoanalytic and Cultural
Perspectives on Forgiveness,” in Before Forgiving: Cautionary Views of Forgiveness in
Psychotherapy, eds. Sharon Lamb and Jeffrie Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002); Sharon Lamb, “Women, Abuse and Forgiveness: A Special Case,” in
Before Forgiving: Cautionary Views of Forgiveness in Psychotherapy, eds. Sharon Lamb and
Jeffrie Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Sharon Lamb,
“Forgiveness Therapy in Gendered Contexts: What Happens to the Truth?” in
Trauma, Truth and Reconciliation, ed. Nancy Potter (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006), 229-256; Elizabeth Spelman, Repair: The Impulse to Restore in a Fragile
World (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002); and Julie Stubbs, “Beyond Apology? Domestic
Violence and Critical Questions for Restorative Justice,” Criminology and Criminal
Justice 7.2 (2007): 169-187.
2
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that of the recipient, the content of the apology, or the practice
apologizing itself.
Why should a philosopher of apology pay attention to gender,
in particular? Philosophers have focused on the moral nature of
public apologies; that is, how such apologies function to take and
express responsibility appropriately, to acknowledge the impact of
wrongful harm on victims, and to contribute to moral and relational
repair following wrongdoing. Philosophers have asked themselves
when and for what it is morally appropriate to apologize, as well as
how best to accomplish this task – that is, what makes for a good or
even an ideal apology.5 Normative theories of apology refer to
familiar moral-philosophical themes of responsibility, respect, and
moral emotion. In assessing an apology, we ask how serious the
wrong was, how deeply it harmed and disrespected the victim, how
far the apologizer takes responsibility, and how sincere her remorse
appears to be. Yet feminist philosophical work has challenged
traditional approaches to responsibility and to the emotions,
demonstrating how both our moral practices and subsequent
philosophical reflection on them are implicitly gendered, often in
ways that harm or undermine the agency of women.6 If the complex
For an overview of the philosophical literature on apology, see the following
sources: Louis F. Kort, “What Is an Apology?” Philosophy Research Archives 1 (1975):
80-87; Kathleen Gill, “The Moral Functions of an Apology,” The Philosophical Forum
31.1 (March 2000): 11-27, doi:10.1111/0031-806X.00025; Spelman, Repair: The
Impulse to Restore in a Fragile World; Sharon Lamb and Jeffrie Murphy, Before Forgiving:
Cautionary Views of Forgiveness in Psychotherapy (Oxford, New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002); Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations after
Wrongdoing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Charles Griswold,
Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007); Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008); Linda Radzik, Making Amends: Atonement in Morality, Law,
and Politics (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Christopher
Bennett, The Apology Ritual: A Philosophical Theory of Punishment (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010).
6 The traditional ‘responsible person’, for example, was represented as an atomistic,
autonomous, unencumbered individual, defined apart from their significant
relationships. Feminists have shown both how this picture of the autonomous self
only represents—at best—a select, elite few (whose autonomy depends on the
5
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collection of behaviours, images, trait-attributions, and power
relations that together constitute gender affects how we conceive of
and recognize moral wrongs, respect, responsibility, and remorse,
then the nature of apologizing cannot be separated from the genders
of those engaged in it.
In this paper, I present a two-part argument for ‘gendering’
theories of public apology. First, I show that gender is deeply
implicated in significant harms for which public apologies are
demanded. Second, I argue there are multiple connections between
gender and practices of public apology, connections that become
evident once we consider apologies as public narratives, performed in
public spaces and expressive of public responsibility.
Apologies and Gendered Harm
Apologies are offered in the aftermath of wrongful harm. In making
an apology, the apologizer represents him or herself as someone who
takes responsibility for the actions in question, views them as both
wrongful and harmful, acknowledges their impact on his or her
victim(s), and expresses regret and remorse for both the wrongs and
their effects on others.7 Many apologies go further in taking

labour of others) and how it fails to acknowledge a myriad of other ways in which
we are responsible and responsive to one another, in chosen and unchosen
relationships.
7 The language of ‘taking’ responsibility is a deliberate choice here. Some may
argue only the wrongdoer herself can apologize: anyone else would not bear the
appropriate relationship of moral responsibility. I disagree; accomplices, inactive
bystanders, witnesses, and members of a morally relevant collective may find
themselves called upon to take responsibility for some or all of a given wrongdoing,
or may wish to present themselves as responsible by apologizing for it. Insisting
that no one but the primary wrongdoer can appropriately apologize ignores the
complexities of responsibility for wrongdoing, as demonstrated by recent feminist
work on the topic. See Iris Marion Young, “Responsibility and Global Labor
Justice,” Journal of Political Philosophy 12.4 (2004): 365-388; Tracy Isaacs, Moral
Responsibility in Collective Contexts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); and
Serena Parekh, “Getting to the Root of Gender Inequality: Structural Injustice and
Political Responsibility,” Hypatia 26.4 (2011): 672-689. Whether that relationship of
responsibility is accepted by the putative recipient (and others) is a different
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.2, 2013, 126-147
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responsibility: offering some compensation or reparation, promising
not to engage in any further, similar, actions or policies, and taking
further steps to mend or build the relationship between apologizer
and addressee.
Central to the success of a given apology is the question of fit:
do the elements of narrative (i.e. the story that is told by the
apologizer), responsibility, and future commitment fit the seriousness
and extent of the wrongful harms in question? Do they match up to
what happened? To whom it happened? Do they accurately describe
the relationships involved? An apology can misfire when its
recounting of the wrong does not match the victim’s own
understanding, whether by downplaying the harm involved, offering
excuses, casting the apologizer’s intentions in a better light, or
glossing over key aspects of the injury. Equally problematic are
apologizers who address the wrong victim altogether,
mischaracterizing what happened by rewriting to whom it happened.
Apologies are performative utterances—in J.L. Austin’s terms, they
do things with words8—and what they do is accomplished, in large
part, by the story that is told: their narrative power. Apologies can
alert others to the very fact of wrongdoing, draw witnesses’ attention
to the extent of the harms done, elicit sympathy and solidarity from
new sources, and can convince skeptics that the victim’s claims are
legitimate. Part of the demand for an apology arises out of the
satisfaction that comes from having one’s story acknowledged
publicly, especially if the events have caused distress, or have been
widely denied: “Yes, that’s what happened to me. That’s why it hurts.
That’s it, exactly.” The narrative power of public apologies is
especially significant, as these can also alter legal and political record,
changing official histories, and can reverberate across media and
popular discourses both nationally and internationally.
Thus normative theorists of public apology ought to pay
attention to gender if for no other reason than the content of public
question, but by apologizing, one of the things an apologizer does is to position
herself in a relationship of responsibility to the act in question.
8 J. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1975).
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.2, 2013, 126-147
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apologies—how we conceive of and articulate what gets apologized
for—affects their practice, and gendered harms are something for
which public officials are called upon to apologize. Indeed, there are
four different kinds of harm in which gender is particularly
implicated. They include gendered harms to groups targeted on the
basis of gender, e.g. sexual violence as a tool of war, harms to mixedgender groups that have a gendered dimension that intensifies or
amplifies the harm (e.g. certain harms to families and family homes),
patterns of sexism and gender-based exclusion, and harms likely to be
overlooked for gender-related reasons.
In a period nicknamed the “Age of Apology,”9 the culture of
ubiquitous apology has not yet extended to gendered harms;
apologies for harms against groups of women remain relatively rare.
Official apologies are typically invoked as a form of symbolic
reparation, offered alongside financial and material reparations, in the
aftermath of conflict or oppression,10 and efforts to include
reparations for harms against women in any larger reparation
movements are still nascent— indeed, recognition of many gendered
harms themselves is recent. Acts of sexual violence can now be
charged as war crimes, acts of genocide, and crimes against humanity
under international law, but this recognition only solidified with the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda 11. Moreover, sexual violence is not the only harm women
suffer in situations of armed conflict and political oppression.
Margaret Urban Walker’s work on gendered violence and reparations
makes the case for recognizing a far more complex matrix of
Mark Gibney, Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Niklaus
Steiner, The Age of Apology: Facing up to the Past (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
10 Margaret Urban Walker, “The Expressive Burden of Reparations: Putting
Meaning into Money, Words, and Things,” in Justice, Responsibility and Reconciliation in
the Wake of Conflict, eds. Alice MacLachlan and C. Allen Speight, Boston Studies in
Philosophy, Religion and Public Life (Dor: Springer, 2013).
11 Margaret Urban Walker, “Gender Violence in Focus: A Background for Gender
Justice in Reparations,” in The Gender of Reparations: Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies While
Redressing Human Rights Violations, ed. Ruth Rubio-Marin (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 18.
9
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gendered violence, emphasizing how gender may augment or
reinforce broader harms in complicated and subtle ways, while Ruth
Rubio-Marin notes that “reparations efforts in the past have
concentrated on violations of a fairly limited and traditionally
conceived category of civil and political rights.12 Even within the
now recognized category of sexual violence—and considering the
widely documented use of rape in warfare—there remain only a few
notable examples of official apologies to groups of women for sexual
violence, past or present.
Most famous, perhaps, are the various apologies to former
‘comfort women’— that is, women from Korea, China, the
Philippines and other Japan-occupied territories who were forced to
provide sex to Japanese soldiers, during World War II. These
apologies took several forms over several decades. In 1992, a
Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato offered an official
apology to Korean former comfort women. Since 1996, letters of
apology have been sent, signed by various Japanese Prime Ministers,
to individual former comfort women. Finally, in March of 2007, an
initial denial that the Japanese government was implicated in sex
slavery by Prime Minister Toru Yamanaka resulted in an official
parliament-level apology.13
There are a few, more recent, examples of official apologies
issued in the wake of sexual violence. 2012 saw the US Assistant
Secretary of State apologize after two American servicemen raped

Rubio-Martin, “The Gender of Reparations in Transitional Societies,” 64.
For a more detailed history and analysis of this case, see the special issue of
positions: asia critique (5:1 Spring 1997) dedicated to discussing the history of
‘comfort women’, as well as “Comforting the Nation: ‘Comfort Women’, the
Politics of Apology and the Workings of Gender.” See also Norma Field, “War
and Apology: Japan, Asia, the Fiftieth, and After,” Positions: Asia Critique 5.1 (1997):
1-49; Hyun Sook Kim, “History and Memory: The ‘Comfort Women’
Controversy,” positions: asia critique 5.1 (1997): 73-108; Won Soon Park, “Japanese
Reparations Policies and the ‘Comfort Women’ Question,” Positions: Asia Critique
5.1 (1997): 107-136; and You-Me Park, “Comfroting the Nation: ‘Comfort
Women,’ the Politics of Apology and the Workings of Gender,” Interventions:
International Journal of Postcolonial Studies 2.2 (2000): 199-211.
12
13
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Japanese women,14 and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police issue an
apology for their inaction and recalcitrance in the case of Robert
Pickton, a Vancouver serial killer who targeted sex trade workers. 15
Yet these incidents are dwarfed by the broader pattern of silence
following sexual violence. Apologies for documented policies of
sexual violence during civil and international war have not been
forthcoming, for the most part, despite repeated calls by advocates
and NGOs. Notorious examples include the systematic brutalization
and rape of Bangladeshi women during the 1971 Pakistani invasion,16
the estimated 100,000 victims of mass rape during the three decades
of civil war in Guatamala,17 or the victims and survivors of the 60,000
estimated rapes that took place during the Bosnian War.18 Indeed,
while Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic recently offered an apology
Martin Fackler, “U.S. Troops in Japan on Curfew Amid Rape Inquiries,” The New
York Times (October 19, 2012); available from
http:l//www.nytimes.com/2012/10/20/world/asia/curfew-imposed-on-americantroops-in-japan.html.
15 The sincerity and extent of this apology remains the subject of controversy. See
Susan Lazaruk, “RCMP Offer Apology over Investigation,” Canada.com (January 27,
2012); available from
http://www.canada.com/RCMP+offer+apology+over+investigation/6066952/st
ory.html; “RCMP Apologizes for Not Doing More in Pickton Investigation,” The
Toronto Star, January 27, 2012, sec. News; available from
http://www.thestar.com/news/article/1122788--rcmp-apologizes-for-not-doingmore-in-pickton-investigation?bn=1; and “RCMP Apology over Pickton Murder
‘Not Enough,’ Victim’s Father Says,” The Globe and Mail; available from
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/rcmp-apology-overpickton-murder-not-enough-victims-father-says/article542859/.
16 Bijoyeta Das, “Bangladesh Rape Victims Say War Crimes Overlooked,” Women’s
eNews, September 6, 2011; available from
http://womensenews.org/story/rape/110904/bangladesh-rape-victims-say-warcrimes-overlooked#.Uh9jJGTTVpI.
17 Ofelia De Pablo, Javier Zurita, and Giles Tremlett, “Guatemalan War Rape
Survivors: ‘We Have No Voice,’” The Guardian, July 28, 2011; available from
http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/jul/28/guatemalan-women-massrape-give-evidence.
18 Michele Lent Hirschl, “Bosnia (Women’s Media Center: Women Under Siege),”
February 8, 2012; available from
http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/conflicts/profile/bosnia.
14
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for the massacre of 8,000 Muslims in Srebrenica,19 he failed to
mention the gang rapes that were part of these genocidal acts, and
there has been no apology for the mass gang rapes in Foca, in 1992,20
or indeed the 20,000-60,000 estimated rapes that took place over the
course of the war, despite calls from organizations like the
Association of Women Victims of War and Mothers of Srebrenica. If
we are living in an age of apology, then sexual violence stands in stark
contrast to the prevailing Zeitgeist.
Furthermore, sexual violence is not the only gendered harm
that calls for apology. There is a gendered dimension to historical
wrongs not typically categorized as gendered wrongs. These include the
forced displacement of populations, the removal of children from
homes and families, as well as control over reproduction, including
forced abortions and sterilization. In 2008, the Australian and
Canadian governments apologized to indigenous peoples for the
forced removal of children from families and communities, through
government policies of residential schools and forced placement in
white homes. There exist multiple dimensions of serious harm in
these racist and genocidal policies, but gender is among them. The
seizure of children led to the destruction of families, homes, and
communities, and the effects of harms to family are often
disproportionately felt by women.21 Furthermore, the excuse for
seizing indigenous children was—in many cases—spurious claims of
unfit (typically explained as insufficiently Christian) homes.
Indigenous mothering was judged by colonial authorities to be
Damien McElroy, “Serbian President in Historic Srebrenica Massacre Apology,”
Telegraph.co.uk, April 25, 2013; sec. worldnews; available from
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/serbia/10017552/Serbianpresident-in-historic-Srebrenica-massacre-apology.html.
20 Brandon Hamber and Ingrid Palmary, “Gender, Memorialization, and Symbolic
Reparations,” in The Gender of Reparations: Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies While Redressing
Human Rights Violations, ed. Ruth Rubio-Marin (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2009), 368-369.
21 I discuss these apologies in more detail in Alice MacLachlan, “Government
Apologies to Indigenous Peoples,” in Justice, Responsibility and Reconciliation in the
Wake of Conflict, eds. Alice MacLachlan and C. Allen Speight; Boston Studies in
Philosophy, Religion and Public Life (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).
19
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insufficient mothering, and so state and church schools (rife with
cultural, physical, and sexual violence) were required to remedy this
supposed gender role failure.22 Indeed, an exhaustive list of apologies
for gendered harms would also track calls for apology regarding past
and present government policies of reproductive violence, including
forced or denied abortions, practices of sterilization, coerced
marriages, as well as the forcible removal of children from homes.
These harms are all gendered-based both because they are committed
against women, and because their spurious justifications invoke
gender ideals—that is, they are committed against women deemed to
fall short of gendered ideals of femininity and motherhood.
Apology, Power, and Performance
The remainder of my discussion turns from the possible content of
public apologies to the practice itself. Gender complicates how an
apology is performed, taken up, and read by others, as well as the
apology’s transformative significance for broader political change, in
ways that are not immediately evident. First of all, people of
different genders are likely to be socialized differently when it comes
to the rhetorical spaces of apology: that is, situations of conflict,
anger, and resentment. Women—that is, persons socialized to see
themselves as feminine and who are treated as feminine by others—
face pressures to be “compassionate and giving” rather than “angry
and vindictive” victims that men in positions of privilege do not.
Indeed, there is a substantial body of feminist work that describes
how women are socialized not to express anger, how their anger is
less likely to receive uptake from others, and how it may even lead to
significant social punishment.23 Just who is able to express
This is discussed in detail the role that sexism and sexual violence played in the
colonial suppression of indigenous cultures across North America in Andrea Smith,
Conquest: Sexual Violence and the American Indian Genocide (Cambridge, MA: South
End Press, 2005).
23 This is not to say that only women experience such pressures, or that all women
face them uniformly. For example, men of colour – whose anger is stigmatized
and exaggerated in racist society – may also experience pressure to be ‘calm’,
‘cooperative’ victims that white men and women do not. Similarly, persons
22
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resentment, whose resentment gets read as appropriate, forceful and
justified, and which protests are seen as warranting a response—these
variables affect practices of apology. Women may be at risk of
prematurely accepting apologies, accepting them for problematic
reasons, or offering them for wrongs for which they are not
responsible.
This scholarship redirects our attention from the apology
itself to the rhetorical space in which it is uttered, a rhetorical space
that is inflected by power. Philosophers have tended to focus on
apology as a moral space, in which the apologizer lowers herself to the
recipient, correcting for the asymmetrical disrespect of wrongdoing. 24
But apologies also take place in social spaces, marked by various
asymmetries of social and political power, and thus vary widely in
their expressions of power. We need only consider the difference
between “I’m so, so very sorry—please, please forgive me” when
spoken in rushed, anxious and soft tones and “I accept full
responsibility for this unfortunate incident and sincerely apologize for
diagnosed with mental illnesses may fear being labeled ‘hysterical’, ‘unreasonable’ or
‘mad’, in ways that track the stigma attached to female anger (certainly, the history
of mental illness diagnosis is itself gendered). In other words, thinking about
rhetorical spaces of anger draws our attention to multiple forms of oppression, and
how these affect practices of apology. See Marilyn Frye, “A Note on Anger,” in
The Politics of Reality (Berkeley: Crossing Press, 1983); Audre Lorde, “The Uses of
Anger: Women Responding to Racism,” in Sister Outsider (Los Angeles: Crossing
Press, 1984); Sue Campbell, “Being Dismissed: The Politics of Emotional
Expression,” Hypatia 9.3 (1994): 46-65; Sharon Lamb, “Forgiveness Therapy in
Gendered Contexts: What Happens to the Truth?” in Trauma, Truth and
Reconciliation, ed. Nancy Potter (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Alison
Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology,” in The Feminist
Philosophy Reader, eds. A. Bailey and C. Cuomo (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008);
Kathryn Norlock, Forgiveness from a Feminist Perspective (Lanham MD: Lexington
Books, 2009); and Carol Gilligan, Joining the Resistance: Psychology, Politics, Girls, and
Women (New York: Polity Press, 2011).
24 Jean Hampton, “Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred,” in Jeffrie Murphy and
Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988); Pamela Hieronymi, “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62.3 (May 1, 2001): 529–555; and Adrienne
M. Martin, “Owning up and Lowering down: The Power of Apology,” Journal of
Philosophy 107.10 (2010): 534-553.
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any offense,” uttered loudly, slowly, with confidence and authority.
The former renounces social or interpersonal power, while the latter
reinforces it. Words of apology can function as performative
softeners, offering up moral authority or, on the other hand, they can
serve to retain control over the rhetorical space: asserting a particular
narrative while demanding that the hearer now respond. Philosopher
Elizabeth Spelman describes the latter effect as the ‘subpoena’ power
of apology, “pressing you for an appearance, a response… You have
lost the moral high ground your anger might have afforded you. But
more, it shifts the burden now to you.”25 Legal scholar Julie Stubbs
notes that there is not only a “strong social norm that encourages
victims to accept an apology, even if it is not a convincing apology”
but further that “apology is a common strategy used by abusive
men…a feature of the ‘cycle of violence’.”26
The social identities (and attendant socialization) of
apologizer and recipient are relevant to how we understand the
relational effects of apology: that is, how it changes the relationship
between speaker and hearer. Indeed, gender is not the only relevant
variable at play here—apologies between individuals of different
races, classes, ages, abilities and citizenships may require similar
considerations of social power. Furthermore, considering the
rhetorical spaces of apology reveals that we cannot assume apologies
always function to effectively ‘lower’ the apologizer or ‘raise’ the
recipient. Indeed, even in strictly moral terms, apologies do not
always have an ultimately ‘lowering’ effect; equally, they are acts of
moral cleansing. In apologizing, I take responsibility for wrong-doing
but I also cast myself as right-thinking: someone who recognizes
appropriate moral norms and possesses the courage to face up to
past misdeeds, rather than shying away from my accuser. All in all,
the apologizer can come out of the apology looking better and not
worse.27 In other words, the power dynamics of apologies compound
the problem of widespread failures to appropriately recognize and
Spelman, Repair, 99.
Stubbs, “Beyond Apology?” 177.
27 I discuss the inflections of power in rhetorical spaces of apology in more detail in
“Telling Sorry Stories” (unpublished).
25
26
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offer reparations for gendered harms. Not only are gendered harms
less likely to be recognized and gendered expressions of resentment
less likely to be given uptake, but the moral practices we employ to
manage and repair wrongdoing (apologies, acceptance, forgiveness)
may reinforce rather than disrupt the asymmetries between
wrongdoer and victim.
Public and Private Narratives
Above, I noted that the narrative power of official apologies is
significant, because they typically address a vast audience beyond the
recipient, through national and international media coverage. This is
not merely a question of large numbers. Official apologies are public
narratives; they are uttered in public spaces, by public representatives,
and are thus treated as matters of public interest, invoking the
interests and concerns of society as a whole. From a gendered
perspective, the public quality of official apologies is crucial, as the
public/private binary and subsequent relegation of the feminine to
the private sphere often comes to the fore in times of conflict. First,
women’s roles in conflict and resistance are often overlooked and
depoliticized, even by women themselves. Colleen Duggan and Adila
Abusharaf note that testimonials by women to truth commissions
tend to concern “experiences of their menfolk, their children, and
their loved ones” rather than the harms they themselves have
suffered, or the actions they themselves have taken.28 Second, victims
of sexual and gendered violence often face significant socially
enforced silence, shaming, and ostracization. As a result, such
violence either remains entirely invisible, or is treated as abstract, a
“stain on upon the social fabric of the nation, rather than being
interpreted as a violation of women’s rights as individuals.”29 Duggan
and Abusharaf conclude that women victims are mostly like to fall
between the cracks of truth commissions, which are less likely to be
Colleen Duggan and Adila Abusharaf, “Reparation of Sexual Violence in
Democratic Transitions: The Search for Gender Justice,” in The Handbook of
Reparations, ed. Pablo De Greiff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 639.
29 Ibid., 631.
28
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gender-attentive, and women’s groups, which are forward- rather
than backward-looking in their focus.
Given the relegation of women’s experiences of harm, there
is moral and political significance to the recognition offered by the
sheer fact of public apology. An official apology has the power to
name harms to women as wrongful harms, when they have not
previously been publicly recognized as such. At the same time, it also
asserts public (i.e. state or society-wide) responsibility for what are
often seen as private, apolitical matters, or inevitable consequences of
biology and soldier ‘boys being boys.’ Finally, public apologies name
the victims as appropriate moral addressees, persons worth taking
seriously and holding others accountable. A public apology, done
well, offers tripartite recognition: women victims are named as moral
interlocutors,30 gendered and sexual harms are identified as
significantly wrongful, and the state takes wider social responsibility
for cultures of impunity around sexism and sexual violence. The
performance of a public apology—words read out by a person of
authority, in the space of government, and given air-time by national
and international audiences–brings what has been considered private
into public space through the presence of the victims who carry the
marks of harm, thus disrupting the familiar public/private binary that
hides harms to women and sexual abuse in private homes, reinforces
patriarchy, and limits women’s agency. Public apologies can thus
potentially play a role in changing problematic gender dynamics and
public conceptions of gender, and these social changes, in turn, may
be an important part of post-conflict social and political repair.31
Lynne Tirrell, “Apologizing for Atrocity: Rwanda and Recognition,” in Justice,
Responsibility and Reconciliation in the Wake of Conflict, eds. Alice MacLachlan and C.
Allen Speight (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013).
31 Philosopher Colleen Murphy has argued that we should measure political
reconciliation partly in terms of post-conflict political relationships that
demonstrate reciprocity and respect for agency. See Colleen Murphy, A Moral
Theory of Political Reconciliation (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press,
2010). We can expand Murphy’s argument and note that, since sexist relationships
are asymmetrical rather than reciprocal, and disrespect women’s agency, changing
widespread sexist conceptions of gender also contributes to conditions of political
reconciliation throughout a given society.
30
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Of course, to achieve this recognition, public apologies must
get the narrative right. Misrepresenting, neglecting or glossing over
wrongs, and failing to acknowledge victims and their experiences,
risks re-inflicting harms of silencing and disrespect. Furthermore, it
plays into the gendered dynamics described in the previous section,
creating a rhetorical space where there is excessive pressure on
women to shoulder the responsibility for relational harmony by
accepting the apology. Yet naming the harm appropriately is
complicated by patriarchy, as the identification of the exact ‘harm’
involved in harmful treatments of women may itself be open to sexist
interpretation. Many have critiqued the apology letters by Japanese
Prime Ministers to former ‘comfort women’ for remaining vague
about the nature of the violations in question, retaining euphemistic
language, and tending to emphasize the harm to “honour and
dignity”—an understanding of sexual slavery and violence that
reinforces the link between women’s agency and value, on the one
hand, and their sexuality and, especially, their sexual purity, on the
other.
Moreover, the recognition power of apology can be
compromised not only by the story that is told, but also by the choice
of storyteller and the process of story-creation. In the context of
transnational public apologies, one head of state typically apologizes
to another. Since there remain very few female heads of state, public
apologies are often made by one man and to another, each standing
in for a broader group or polity. If women are present only as the
objects of apology (that which is apologized for) and not the subjects
of apology (either as speaker or hearer), then their subjectivity and
agency is undermined and the private/public division is reinforced
and not challenged. There is something especially disconcerting about
representative responsibility, when the harm in question is gendered
sexual violence. As Helen Field remarks:
Think, for example, of Prime Minister Hosokawa apologizing
for Japanese colonial rule, including the institution of military
comfort women, and South Korea President Kim Young Sam
praising the prime minister’s “understanding of history”…
How, one wonders, did those two men, in the prime of
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.2, 2013, 126-147
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public life, understand the sexual humiliation and unending
suffering of those elderly women, for the most part of
humble origin?32
Earlier I noted that apologies reinforce and vindicate the
agency of the victim, by telling the story of the wrong as she herself
understands it (“Yes, that’s it, that’s what happened to me…”). But
without consultation and attention to what victims themselves have
to say, apologies remain wrongdoer narratives; the wrongdoer has the
microphone, after all, even if he is uttering what it is victims would
have chosen to acknowledge, had they the choice. This is risky for
any apology, but particularly when individuals with considerable
political power speak on behalf of those with very little, with very
different experiences, and whose harms are likely to be made invisible
or misrepresented.33 An apologizer who gets the content, tone and
sincerity of apology right, from the perspective of standard
philosophical theories, can thus go morally wrong. Without attention
to and care for victim input, the apology is paternalistic at best. At
worst, the apologizer further objectifies the victim, making her the
object and not the author of her own experiences.34
Even the notion of giving voice to silenced harms is not
without its moral pitfalls. While public, authoritative, truth telling
around gendered and sexual violence may ultimately disrupt cultures
of shame and silence, one apology alone cannot accomplish this
cultural transformation. As long as stigmas and repressive norms
around women’s sexuality persevere, such apologies risks re-harming
Field, “War and Apology,” 7-8.
This also highlights an interesting asymmetry between public and interpersonal
apologies. While the request for victim input is usually taken to be a sign of
insensitive (i.e. bad) private apology – i.e. “Just tell me what to say and I’ll say it!” –
it can add value to a public apology, especially if the victims have not typically had
their voices represented by the state.
34 Indeed, we might describe such apologies as a particularly egregious form of the
sexist act colloquially known as ‘mansplaining’, i.e. when a man informs a woman
of something, at length, that she is in a much better to know (in this case, her own
history of hurt), because of his (unconscious) presumption that he has
epistemological authority and she does not.
32
33
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and humiliating individual victims in the name of that broader social
change. Public apologies may inadvertently “out” victims of sexual
violence, if they are named or alluded to in identifiable ways, putting
them at risk of public humiliation and shame, further ostracization,
and material consequences including the loss of income, home and
family, as well as exposure to physical violence and death.
Solutions to these dilemmas rest in how practices of public
apology prioritize the agency of victims. This will vary from case to
case, meaning that one ‘good’ apology may not resemble another.
Instead of focusing on the conditions for performance of public
apology and the inner state of the apologizer, we need to examine who
is in a position to offer such apologies, how and where they are
offered (whether verbal or written, public or sequestered, anonymous
or named) and the extent to which the agency of the victims is
prioritized, in the periods leading up to and following the apology.
For theorists of apologies, this means focusing on apologies as
practice rather than performance. The value of an uttered apology
may lie in the process of constructing what ultimately gets said—who
is involved, how equal and collaborative the process is, and who is
chosen to speak—rather than the isolated act of speaking those
words sincerely.
Equally important are the rhetorical spaces that follow and
are opened up by an apology. As noted above, apologies can demand
certain responses from victims and foreclose others, especially when
those victims are socialized to repress anger and prioritize harmony:
in Spelman’s words, their interpersonal powers of ‘subpoena.’35
However powerful public apologies may be, they are unlikely to
magically accomplish victim healing, which means that primary and
secondary victims may still want to revisit histories of harm,
uncovering further details and bringing new evidence and insights to
light.36 Thus, we have reason to distinguish between apologies that
Spelman, Repair.
For example, Canadian historian Ian Mosby’s recent research uncovered a grim
history of nutritional experiments and tests performed on malnourished Aboriginal
children in residential schools, several years after the Canadian government apology
Ian Mosby, “Administering Colonial Science: Nutrition Research and Human
35
36
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function as subpoenas and those that open up rhetorical space for a
wide variety of responses; the latter and not the former will likely
reinforce victim agency. Philosophers have typically defined a good
apology as one that gives the recipient definitive reasons to accept it.
This assumes that the state of harmony that follows the acceptance
of apology is always better than the disharmony that preceded it.
When it comes to complicated histories of public and private
wrongdoing, gendered or otherwise, this assumption does not hold.
In gendered political contexts, where the apology may be one step in
a longer process of negotiated narrative and meaning, ‘good’
apologies leave space for resistance as well as acceptance.
Apology, Gender and Responsibility
Skeptics of public apology fear that unless they are accompanied by
some other, material, measure of responsibility, such apologies are
little more than a cheap and empty gesture; they seem to take
responsibility while actually failing to do so in any concrete way.
Simply naming oneself as responsible is not sufficient for moral selfcongratulation, such skeptics object. The question is not, is the
government responsible for past violence or injustice? (since all too often, there
is widespread, credible evidence and common understanding that
they are) but rather what will they do about it? And certainly, apologyskeptics have a point: apologies can potentially attend more to the
state of the wrongdoers’ souls than the state of the victims’ lives,
purging guilt and purifying the polity by narrating a story of moral
growth and development, while victims remain marginalized,
deprived and in compromised material circumstances.37 Indeed, one
Biomedical Experimentation in Aboriginal Communities and Residential Schools,
1942-1952,” Histoire sociale/Social History 46, no. 91 (2013): 145–172.. Assembly of
First Nations Chief Shawn Atleo and other First Nations leaders have demanded a
new apology, further inquiry, and measures of reparation, but these calls are being
resisted by the Canadian federal government “First Nations Leaders Demand
Apology for Nutritional Experiments - Manitoba - CBC News,” accessed August
29, 2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2013/07/17/mbaboriginal-children-nutritional-experiments-reax-national.html..
37 For example, the 2008 Canadian apology for residential schools stated that “we
now recognize it was wrong” to separate indigenous children from their families
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of the benefits of thinking about apologies as a process and not a
performance the process may include not only future dialogue, but
also the material and political commitments made in the apology
utterance. Good processes of apology may have financial as well as
discursive dimensions.
At the same time, even the mere admission of state
responsibility is often a tremendous step forward, when it comes to
gender violence and injustice. Human rights scholars and activists
continue to hotly debate the extent to which states can be held
responsible for patterns and practices of gender-based violence and
inequality, despite the UN Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979.38
Despite ever-increasing research and investigation into the systematic
basis for rape as a tool of war, and gender violence as a tool of
colonialism, specific harms to women are too often dismissed as the
result of ‘bad apples,’ ‘soldier boys being boys’ or problematic, but
private and apolitical matters. The ceremony and publicity of an
official apology challenge this perception. A public narrative of
responsibility, even without further (financial) measure, accomplishes
three things: first, by naming the harms together in public, it draws
connections between seemingly discrete incidents, revealing a broader
culture of impunity and sexism. Second, it brings the wrongfulness
of sexual and gender-based harms into broader, national
and culture, as if this realization was a new development, prompting the apology—
the result of recent soul-searching and moral progress. Yet Canada had signed and
ratified the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide,
many decades before the last residential school closed. The Convention lists, in
Article 2, “forcibly transferring the children of the group to another group” as an
act of genocide. See Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, 1st ed. (New York:
Routledge, 2004), 101-121.
38 CEDAW holds that states party to the convention, in addition to taking
responsibility for specific state-sponsored human rights violations, must “modify
the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customs and all other practices which
are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or
on stereotyped roles for men and women,” in Article 5. See Parekh, “Getting to
the Root of Gender Inequality.”.
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conversation. Third, by taking responsibility for these harms, the
government implicitly commits itself to discharging that
responsibility—meaning that others can now hold the government
accountable for that commitment. Moreover, as Serena Parekh notes,
governments are able to discharge responsibilities for structural
problems in ways that individuals cannot: publicizing and educating
others about their role in widespread harms, changing processes that
made these harms possible, and acting collectively in response to
those harms.39
Furthermore, symbolic acts of reparation have some
advantages that material reparations do not. Brandon Hamber and
Ingrid Palmary note:
Symbolic offer a unique opportunity to produce complex
narratives because, unlike legal questions concerning, say,
compensation where more clear delineations are needed
between victim and perpetrators, symbolic measures, such as
memorials, apologies, public acknowledgments, or museum
projects, can offer abstract and complex representations of
conflict.40
If patterns of responsibility for sexual and gender violence are
complex, as Parekh argues, then measures adopted to express and
acknowledge that responsibility may need to tell equally complex
narratives. Furthermore, there are additional complications involved
in measuring out responsibility in financial form when it comes to
sexual violence, because of the persistent stigma attached to sex work
and ‘sex for money’ in patriarchal societies. How the wrong for
which money is offered gets named, in the apology, can alleviate the
dangers of re-harming victims through stigma. Navigating the
relationship between apology, responsibility and financial
Serena Parekh, “Getting to the Root of Gender Inequality: Structural Injustice
and Political Responsibility,” Hypatia 26, no. 4 (2011): 672–689.
40 Brandon Hamber and Ingrid Palmary, “Gender, Memorialization, and Symbolic
Reparations,” in The Gender of Reparations: Unsettling Sexual Hierarchies While Redressing
Human Rights Violations, ed. Ruth Rubio-Marin (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2009), 379.
39
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compensation will again be a question of process rather than
performance, with particular attention to how the agency of women
victims is prioritized during that process.
Conclusion
I have argued that normative theorists of public apology need to
incorporate considerations of gender into their work, since gender is
implicated both in many of the harms for which public apologies are
offered, and in the practice, significance, and impact of offering
public apologies in general. Thinking about gender draws our
attention to the power dynamics of apology, revealing that not every
instance of apology is a case of the apologizer ‘lowering’ him or
herself, and that social identities play a role in how we offer and
accept apologies, and the meaning we attribute to them. Moreover,
in the case of public apologies, in particular, attention to gender
reveals the significance of apologies as public narratives, and their
power to challenge or reinforce problematic public/private
distinctions, as well as telling complex stories of public responsibility
for sexual and gender violence. Most significantly, thinking about
gender (and indeed, the asymmetrical power relationships created by
social power and group identity, more generally) reveals that the
moral value of apologies does not ultimately lie in the performance of
words or the inner state of the apologizer who utters them. If, as
philosophers have argued, apologies are valuable because they respect
the agency of victims, then that respect emerges most in the
processes of discourse, negotiation, and listening that precede and
follow that utterance, “We’re Sorry.”
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